Delusions, emotions (and possibly pheromones)

[PheroQuirk]

Psychiatry and the Human Condition

False beliefs are unavoidable in mental state inferences
The false beliefs found in delusional disorder are social, and inevitably involve making mental state inferences - ie. judging the dispositions, motivations and intentions of other people. Mistakes in evaluating dispositions, motivations and intentions are inevitable. Beliefs concerning the mental state of others are always inferences based upon insecure (emotionally-derived) assumptions, they cannot always be true because beliefs cannot be checked against objective criteria - there is no direct access to other minds.
Inferences concerning the state and content of other minds depend upon information from one’s own subjective emotional responses, as well as from observed behavioral cues. When subjective emotional response is inappropriate, then the inference of mental state will be wrong. For example, inappropriate fear may lead to a false belief concerning the hostile intentions of a male stranger, and this may emerge as a persecutory delusion. There is no secure way of checking whether fear of another person is appropriate, whether Big Al really is as aggressive as he makes you feel, or whether beneath the granite exterior beats a heart of gold. The link between emotions and delusional disorder may also be seen in the reported association between low self-esteem (ie. perceived low status) and morbid jealousy. If a man believes he is unattractive to his wife and other women, he is more likely to believe that his wife is motivated towards having a sexual relationship with another and more attractive man.

. Beliefs concerning ToM inferences will be resistant to counter-argument
Beliefs concerning the state of mind of other people may be resistant to counter-argument since the human social domain is intrinsically competitive. We would be foolish always to be persuaded by the arguments of other, since everybody is ‘in competition’ with everybody else to a greater or lesser extent - even close family members will lie to one another (whether ‘for their own good’ or to shape behaviour in a more personally advantageous direction).
Indeed, it is suggested that the ToMM evolved as a direct consequence of human versus human competition. We base our assessments of others upon the emotions they evoke in us, ‘I know everybody says he is nice, but I don’t trust him - he makes me feel uncomfortable’. These feelings have adaptive significance. Deception and concealment of hostile motivations and damaging intentions can be expected in the social domain.
Mistrustfulness concerning the reassurances of others is - in this sense - adaptive. Dishonesty from other people - in these matters - is to be anticipated. Would your best friend really tell you if your wife was having an affair? Many people lie in such circumstances, for all kinds of reasons. Especially when it might be your best friend that is having the affair… It therefore makes sense that - despite their being based upon insecure inferences - beliefs concerning theory of mind will neither be labile nor readily abandoned. In a rivalrous social world where no-one can wholly be trusted, each person must reach their own conclusions about the motivations, disposition and relationships of other people.